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PRACTICAL LESSONS FROM FAILURE OF A REINFORCED SOIL RETAINING 
WALL ON A MAJOR HIGHWAY 
 
P. Jagannatha Rao 
Consulting Engineer 






A “Reinforced Soil Retaining Wall” (RSR) wall of 10.5m height collapsed about 5 years after construction.  HDPE geogrids were 
used as reinforcement.  The facia panels suffered outward movements during construction and the deformations continued to increase.  
A 16m long stretch of the RSR wall failed and the failure wedge cut through four layers of reinforcement.  The paper analyses the role 
of different factors in causing the failure.  Tension tests were carried out on the geogrids exhumed from the failed zone.  A significant 
loss in the strength of these grids was found which may be attributed to the high ambient temperatures in the area where the RSR wall 





Reinforced soil retaining walls (referred as RSR walls) with 
granular fill and high strength reinforcement are an 
economical alternative to gravity as well as reinforced 
concrete retaining walls. RSR walls were introduced in India 
in the mid 1990 s, C.R.R.R.I.,(1995 ) and have steadily gained 
wider usage.  The RSR wall case study being presented here 
was designed in 1999-2000 and built in 2000-2001. The RSR 
wall started experiencing large significant outward 
deformations during and after construction.  By September 
2006 severe distress was noticed in some stretches of the RSR 
wall and the need for control measures was apparent.  A 16m 
stretch of the RSR wall collapsed in Nov 2006.  Following the 
distress and collapse, a detailed study and analysis of the 
design and construction was carried out to identify the causes 
for distress and failure and workout the remedial measures. 
 
 
DETAILS OF RSR WALL 
 
The maximum design height of the RSR wall is 10.5m. 
Typical cross section of the RSR Wall along with the location 
of the geogrid reinforcement at different levels is shown in 
Fig.1.This configuration of geogrids is as provided at the 
design stage and given in the design report prepared by the 
design consultant.  The rated strength of the geogrids used in 
the project ranged from 45 to 160 kN/m (ultimate tensile 
strength).The facia elements consisted of 2.0m high, 1m wide 
RCC panels of 150 mm thickness.  In some locations the panel 
height was higher, at 2.5m.Also over most of the length of the 
RSR wall, the height of the top most panels varied from 0.5 to 
1.0m to fit with elevation of the top of the road pavement. 
 
A starter length of geogrid of appropriate length was placed at 
the required location, when the panels were cast.  About 
350mm length of the starter stub projects out of the panel.  
The main reinforcement is connected to the starter by a 
synthetic connector and spread out at the time of construction. 
 
A capping beam of inverted U shape, 600mm wide, 250mm in 
height was provided over the upper most panel and 50mm dia. 
pipe post was attached to the coping beam A 1.0m wide foot 
path of 600mm thick PCC with a steel guardrail along the 
inner edge of the foot path were provided for traffic safety. 
 
 
CONSTRUCTION DETAILS AND INITIAL DISTRESS  
 
As per construction guidelines, the initial batter to be provided 
was 1 in 30, to be adjusted to 1 in 40 after the first lift. It was 
also stated that the wall face would adjust to vertical after a 
period of time.  No details were provided as to how the batter 
was to be maintained and checked.  As construction 
proceeded, it was observed that the facia panels developed an 
uneven profile and appeared to have moved outwards.  
Construction was completed, reportedly, paying greater 
attention to precautions such as ensuring no heavy compaction 
equipment operates with in 1.5m of the wall edge, stretching 





Fig .2: Guard rail and pipe moved out of alignment due to 




Fig.1. Cross Section of RSR Wall as per Design Report  
 
By mid 2001, construction work including the pavement was 
completed. However, the outward movements of the facia 
panels were found to be in the range of 200 to 250mm in the 
highest sections of the RSR wall.  Expert opinion at that time 
suggested that facia movements shall be monitored regularly 
for one year.  The data obtained could be used to project the 
future behaviour of the RSR wall.  No such action was taken 
possibly because the contract did not have any provision for 
such activity.  It was also   felt that the wall movements would 
stabilize as the construction gets completed. A set of 
measurements taken in July2003 indicated a small increase in 
the outward movements of the facia panels and on this basis it 
was assumed that the movements were indeed stabilizing.  
However, more alarming was the tilt and rotation of the 
capping beam observed at many of the sections.  Such 
movements of the capping beam were visible at many sections 
in 2004 and were of large magnitude where the height of the 
RSR wall was maximum.  In retrospect it appears that the 
significance of the tilt and rotation of capping beam was not 
adequately appreciated at that time.        
 
An attempt to prevent further movements of the capping beam 
was made as follows:  Temporary props were set up from the 
ground level.  Capping beam sections were pushed back, as 
much as possible to their original position, and then were fixed 
rigidly to the top most panel by brackets.  However, 
movements of facia and capping beam continued. 
 
In Aug-Sep 2006, cracks appeared at the junction of the 
pavement and the footpath.  Gaps also developed between the 
outer edge of the foot path and facia panels.  The guard rail at 
the inner edge of the footpath and the steel pipe post, both 
located on the capping beam, got out of alignment (Fig. 2 ). 












                         Fig.3.View of collapsed RSR  wall, Exposed Geogrids are seen over the collapsed fill  
 
The deformations and movements continued and as per 
information available outward deformation reached 400-
450mm at some locations.  A section of the RSR wall 
collapsed in Nov 2006(Fig.3).  A wedge of fill material along 
with facia panels fell outwards.  In Fig. 3, Geogrids can be 
seen hanging over the failure surface.  The thickness of the 
wedge at top was found to be ranging between 1.6 to 2.0m, 
along the 16m of collapsed stretch.  The failure surface 
conformed very closely to a circular arc.  The wedge extended 
to about 4.5 to 5.0m down from the top. 
 
 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF DESIGN 
 
As per design document, the design follows the guidelines of 
the geogrid manufacturer as well as B.S.8006-1995(Code of 
practice for reinforced soils and other fills), which is widely 
used in India and provides a conservative design.  Although 
the project requirements did not specify adherence to 
B.S.8006-1995, an expert review at the end of 2000,i.e; before 
the start of construction concluded that the design generally 
follows the above code.  
 
However, detailed review of  the project design indicated 
significant deviations from the manufacturer’s design 
guidelines as well as  B.S.8006-1995.It was also found that the 
properties of fill materials do not satisfy the requirements of 
the project specifications.  The impact of the deviations from 
the design norms and inadequacies of fill material, on the 
stability and deformations of the RSR wall is discussed in the 
following sections   
 
Choice of Reduction Factors 
 
The ultimate tensile strength of the geogrid is reduced by 
reduction factors to account for loss of strength due to creep, 
extrapolation of data, construction damage, environment of the 
fill etc.  The values of each of these factors are provided by 
the manufacturer from carefully conducted tests.  Of all the 
factors creep is most critical and is also temperature 
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 dependent, more so in the case of HDPE geogrids.  Typical 
value of cumulative reduction factor for HDPE grids is about 
4 to 4.5, at 20 ˚C. The allowable stress determined as above 
has the effect of keeping the initial and ‘end of design life 
strains’ at low acceptable levels, thereby keeping the 
deformations of the RSR wall at low values. 
 
It may be mentioned that even as at present there is no widely 
adopted design methodology based on strain calculations. 
Hence, adoption of proper values of reduction factors is 
critical in the design of RSR wall.  The manufacturer’s 
guidelines have not provided values of the partial factors.  
Instead a lumped parameter of 2.12 was provided.  To this, an 
additional reduction factor of 1.30 is applied to account for 
construction, biological factors and junction strength. Thus the 
cumulative reduction factor provided by the manufacturer 
works out to 2.12×1.3=2.76.The manufacturer’s guidelines 
also specify an overtension factor of safety of 1.50. Thus, to 
derive the allowable or usable tensile strength from the 
ultimate value, the reduction factor works out to 
2.76×1.50=4.14.In further discussions, the values of 2.76 and 
4.14 are referred to as overall ‘reduction factors’. 
 
Length of Reinforcement 
 
Further, the length of geogrid provided was 0.6H, where H is 
the design height of the RSR wall, as suggested in 
manufacturer’s design guidelines and no absolute minimum 
length is specified.  However, B.S.8006-1995 specifies 0.7H 
as the minimum reinforcement length with 3.0 m as the 
absolute minimum .Length of geogrid is critical from 
considerations of global stability and pullout resistance.  The 
project RSR wall has adequate stability against global failure. 
Safety against pullout is discussed subsequently. 
 
Properties of Fill Materials 
 
Project specifications required that the fill material shall be 
predominantly coarse grained and not more than 10 percent of 
particles shall be finer than 75 microns.  No requirement of 
minimum friction angle for the fill material was stipulated.   
Tests on fill material carried out prior to the construction 
showed the fines content to be in the range of 25 to 30 percent.  
A few samples showed as much as 70-75percent fines.  At the 
same time test results were also given stating the angle of 
friction to be in the range of 34˚ to 37˚.  Even though the result 
is incongruous, it was used as the basis of RSR wall design 
with angle of friction as 35˚. 
 
Subsequent to failure, fill samples were collected and tested in 
independent laboratory.  The results confirmed the percentage 
of fines to be 30, but the angle of was found to be 29˚ only, a 
much lower value.  Considering the granular composition of 
the fill material and compacted densities measured in the field, 
the lower friction angle is considered representative of the fill 
rather than the higher one.  Clearly such discrepancy in the 
design friction angle has a large adverse effect on the level of 
stability of the RSR wall. 
 
 
INFLUENCE OF REDUCTION FACTORS AND FRICTION 
ANGLE ON THE DESIGN 
 
Table 1 shows allowable tension for the geogrids for the 
following parameters: 
(a) Combination of  reduction factor of 2.12 and 
overtension factor of safety of 1.3,giving an overall 
reduction factor of 2.76,  as used in the design 
(b) Combination of reduction factor of 2.12, overtension 
factor of safety of 1.5 and global factor of safety of 
1.3 as ought to have been used as per manufacturer’s 
guidelines, giving an overall reduction factor of 4.14. 
 
 
Table 1 Effect of Reduction Factors on Allowable Tensile 
Strength of Geogrids 
 
Ultimate tensile strength 
kN/m       
160 120 90 60 45 
Allowable tensile 
strength    kN/m (overall 
reduction 
factor =2.76) 
57.9 43.4 32.6 21.7 16.3 
Allowable tensile 
strength     kN/m (overall 
reduction                             
factor =4.14) 
38.6 28.9 21.8 14.5 10.8 
 
 
The design is based on friction angle =35˚, whereas test results 
have shown this to be 29˚ only.  Lower friction values imply 
higher tensions in the geogrids for the same spacing.  The 
design adopts 1m uniform grid spacing.  Table 2 shows tensile 
force in the geogrids for friction angle of 35˚ and Table 3 
shows that for 29˚, and the tensile force in the geogrids is 
compared with allowable values for both the overall reduction 
factors shown in Table 1. All comparisons are for design wall 
height of 10.5m. 
 
 
CALCULATION OF TENSILE FORCE AND PULLOUT 
RESISTANCE 
 
In the design report, tension in the geogrids was calculated 
using the formula: 
qihii TTT +=     ---- (1) 
where  layer geogrid i in the force thtensileTi =
= [ ] iia VhK   σ     ---- (2) 
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 and tensile force from the uniformly distributed 
surcharge on top of the wall at i
=qiT
th layer. 
=     ---- (3) iaqVK









φ  = angle of fraction of the fill material 
value of φ  = was used in the report, and 0.271 035 =aK
γ = unit weight of fill (18 kN/ ) 3m
q = surcharge (10.8 kN/ )  2m
=iV vertical spacing of geogrids  
ih  = height of the fill above the layer. 
thi
Pullout resistance was calculated using the formula 
Pullout resistance of layer,  thi
poi CP 2=γ   eiL viσ  tan φ   ---- (4) 
=iPγ pullout resistance of layer thi
 viσ  = ( )qhi +γ  = Vertical load on the ith geogrid layer. 
poC  = soil – geogrid pull out coefficient (=0.85) 
eiL  = length of geogrid in the resisting zone, in the  layer. 
thi
       = -  iL aiL
iL  = total length of geogrid in the layer. 
thi
aiL  = length of goegrid in the active zone in the layer. 
thi
 
Table 2. Comparison of Tensile Force (ø =35˚) with Allowable Tensile Strength 
 
Depth 























9.5 1.0 160 51.6 57.9 Considered 
safe as per 
design 




8.5 1.0 160 46.5 57.9 - 38.6 ,, 
7.5 1.0 160 41.3 57.9 - 38.6 ,, 
6.5 1.0 120 36.2 43.4 - 28.9 ,, 
5.5 1.0 120 31.1 43.4 - 28.9 ,, 
4.5 1.0 90 25.9 32.6 - 21.8 ,, 
3.5 1.0 90 20.8 32.6 - 21.8 Level of 
safety is 
adequate 
2.5 1.0 60 15.7 21.7 - 14.5 - 
1.5 1.0 45 10.6 16.3 - 10.8 ,, 
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 Table 3. Comparison of Tensile Force (ø =29˚) with Allowable Tensile Strength 
 
Depth 























9.5 1.0 160 65.8 57.9 Level of 
safety is not 
adequate  




8.5 1.0 160 59.3 57.9 - 38.6 ,, 
7.5 1.0 160 52.8 57.9 - 38.6 ,, 
6.5 1.0 120 46.2 43.4 - 28.9 ,, 




4.5 1.0 90 33.2 32.6 - 21.8 ,, 
3.5 1.0 90 26.6 32.6 - 21.8 ,, 
2.5 1.0 60 20.1 21.7 - 14.5 ,, 
1.5 1.0 45 13.5 16.3 - 10.8 ,, 






Table 4.  Comparison of Pullout Safety for Different Friction Angles 
 
Depth 





Angle of Friction 



















0.5 45 35 5.21 1.18 5.41 28.03 5.11 
0.5 45 29 5.90 0.49 7.01 9.29 1.33 
 
 
Tables 2 and 3 clearly bring out the differences in safety level  
of the RSR wall, based on the values of the parameters used in 
the design vis-à-vis the more appropriate and realistic values. 
From Table 3 it is clear that only the geogrid at elevation of 
0.5 m from the top has adequate level of safety in tension.  
 
Considering pullout, normally the top most layer is critical, 
and the same is discussed now.  Pullout is not directly 
influenced by the allowable tensile strength of the geogrid.  
The angle of friction of the fill has greater role as it influences 
the tensile force, effective reinforcement length and the 
mobilized pullout resistance.  Pullout comparison for ø=35˚ 
and for ø=29˚ for geogrid length of 0.6H is given in Table 4 
below for the top most layer of reinforcement. 
It is seen from table 4 that with the angle of friction of the fill 
equal to 29˚, the failure plane length is longer and the effective 
reinforcement length is correspondingly shorter, the tensile 
force is higher and pullout resistance is lower, as compared to 
the values with friction angle of 35˚ and as a result the pullout 
factor of safety is 1.33, which value is lower than the 
minimum required value of 1.5. 
 
From considerations of critical factors involved in the design, 
viz. reduction factors used in arriving at the allowable tensile 
strength ,factors of safety and friction angle of fill material, it 
is clear that the design is very much on the unsafe side.  The 
nil or inadequate factors of safety in overtension imply that the 
stiffness of the RSR wall is inadequate, ab-initio.  This has 
caused the wall to be susceptible to experience large 
deformations, as indeed has been observed. Full scale studies 
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 on a HDPE reinforced soil retaining wall (Chew S.H.and J.K. 
Mitchell 1996) showed that the wall movements are higher by 
20% for reinforcement length of 0.6H, as compared to those if 
the reinforcement length was 0.7H. 
 
Discrepancy in the Spacing of Geogrids 
 
Besides the above factors which have shown a cumulative 
effect on the large and continuing deformations of the RSR 
wall, a very unusual factor was found during the investigations 
related to its distress and failure, and this factor had an equally 
large destabilizing influence. 
 
 
Fig.4. Cross Section of RSR wall as Built 
Note:  
1. Spacing of lowest and top most grid differs from that 
in the design. 
2. Friction of angle of fill was found to be 290, thus 
lower than assumed in the design. 
 
It was found that the spacing of geogrids as adopted in the 
construction was different from that given in the design report.  
The change was made by the designer, without however, 
evaluating the effects of the same.  In the design report, the 
top most geogrid layer was provided at 0.5m below top of the 
pavement level with subsequent layers of reinforcement being 
spaced at 1.0m intervals each.  The stresses in all the geogrid 
layers were calculated for this pattern of reinforcement layout, 
as shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4.  On the other hand drawings 
provided by the designer, for use in construction, showed the 
lowest reinforcement layer at 0.5m above the foundation level, 
with other layers being spaced at 1.0m intervals from thereon.  
This has resulted the topmost layer being located at 1.0 to1.1m 
below the top of the RSR wall, instead of 0.5m below as used 
in the design calculations.  The design guide lines of the 
manufacturer specify that the geogrid layer immediately above 
the foundation level shall be spaced at not more than 0.5m 
.However, in altering the vertical layout of geogrids to satisfy 
this requirement, no attention was apparently paid to the 
increased distance between the top of the RSR wall and 
nearest geogrid layer. 
 
Careful check of the drawings provided for construction 
showed that most of the top panels, whose height is up to1.0m, 
did not have any geogrid attached to them.  The height of 
these panels is between 0.5 and 1.0m, varying to keep in line 
with the top profile of the RSR wall. 
 
A pit was excavated adjacent to one of the panels, where the 
height of the RSR wall is10.5m, and it was found that the top 
panel of 1.0m height did not have any geogrid attached to it 
and the geogrid was further 10cms below i.e; at a depth of 
1.10m from the top of the RSR wall.  Fig. 4 shows cross 
section of the RSR wall with geogrid spacing in “as built” 
condition. 
 
Following the collapse and failure of the RSR wall, it was 
found that in this section also, the topmost geogrid layers was 
placed 1.10m below the top of the pavement level.  Thus, the 
excavation carried out earlier and the exposed geogrids 
observed in the failed section, both confirm that the spacing of 
geogrids adopted in the construction differs from the one 
given in the design. 
 
As a result of these of these deviations, over a large part of the 
RSR wall the top most panels were just inserted into the ones 
below and on sides.  The capping beam was also resting on the 
top of the poorly fixed top panels.  This arrangement caused 
the capping beam to experience large tilt as the top panels 
moved outwards.  Fixing of the capping beam to the top 
panels was, hence of no use at all.  In a ripple effect, the worst 
placed top panels caused the panels by the sides and below as 
well, to move out.  Further, the panel shape was such that the 
joints between the panels were continuous from top to bottom 
of the RSR wall, and the width of the panels as well as the 
geogrid was 1.0m.No overlap was provided for the geogrids in 
their in their width direction.  This combined configuration of 
panels and geogrid had the effect of considerably decreasing 
the stiffness of the RSR wall. 
 
The large outward movements of the RSR wall are a 
cumulative effect of the factors discussed above. 
 
Results of Tensile Strength Tests on Exhumed Geogrid 
Samples 
 
As stated earlier, a part of the RSR wall collapsed in early Nov 
2006.The failed wedge extends for about 16m length and 5m 
depth below the top.  The width of the wedge ranges from 
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 about 2.0 to 1.6m at the top. Four layers of geogrids failed in 
tension and snapped at the junction with the facia panels.  As 
the fill soil and the facia panels fell down, the four layers of 
geogrids were left hanging out of the fill.  The ultimate tensile 
strength of these geogrids was 45,45,60 and 90 kN/m in 
sequence from top to  bottom of the wedge.1m long samples 
were cut from the top two projecting geogrids and were tested 
for tensile strength in a reputed independent laboratory.  
Geogrid samples from two lower layers were of inadequate 
length for testing as the wedge narrowed down at these levels.  
The results of these tests showed that current tensile strength 
was less than the initial value as well as the peak failure strain 
was lower.  The stress-strain curves at the installation stage 
and failure stage are shown in Fig.5. The strains in the 
geogrids at the critical depths of 1.1 and 2.1m for the 
calculated stress values (ref Table 4) are summarised in Table 
5.   
 
Fig.5. Stress-Strain Relationship of the Geogrid  (UTS 45 kN/m) – at Installation and at Failure 
 
 







Strains   
(kN/m)  
Estimated 
strains      at 




strains  at 
failure stage  
(% ) 
 
1.1 10.9 1.6 2.8 
2.1 17.4 2.6 4.6 
 
 
Results of tensile strength tests show that the geogrids have 
lost about 15% of strength during the period 2001-2006 i.e. 
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 Table 6. Comparison of Stress-Strain Relationship of Geogrids  
as Installed and at Failure      
 
 At Failure As 
Manufactured 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 
 
Tensile strength at 
2% strain kN/m 
7.69 6.0 11.0 
Tensile strength at 
5% strain kN/m 
18.5 19.9 25.0 
Ultimate tensile 
strength kN/m 
38.0 37.2 45.0 
Ultimate strain % 15.0 14.5 11.0 
 
The test results show that tensile strength at failure is less than 
that at manufacture by as much as 16% and strains are higher 
by about 35% as compared to the values at manufacture.  The 
loss of strength of geogrids is attributed to creep.  High 
temperatures in the area of location of the RSR wall also 
appear to have increased the extent of loss strength due to 
creep.  The failed wall has S-W exposure and wall 
temperatures (˚C) would be in excess of 60 for atleast 3months 
and in excess of 50 for another 3 months per year.  The 
manufacturer’s data for reduction factors does not provide 
values for temperatures in excess of 30˚C. Further the designer 
chose to adopt values of reduction factors applicable for 20˚C.  
That the creep characteristics of HDPE geogrids are highly 
sensitive to temperature has not been adequately factored into 
the design.  The collapse of the RSR wall can be attributed to 
the rupture of geogrids which have lost part of their strength 
due to creep.  The project is located in hot semi-arid zone.  
The average annual rainfall is in the range of 400 to 500mm.  
There was no high rainfall in the weeks preceding the rainfall.  
Rainy season normally ends in the middle of September. 
 
Results of Stability Analysis 
 
Stability analysis was carried out for circular failure wedges 
5m deep and width of 1.6and 2.0m at the top.  The trial 
wedges formed a part of circular arc of 9.2m dia. and 9.33m 
dia. for 2.0mdeep and 1.6 m deep ones, respectively.  The 
analysis was carried out using Bishop’s simplified method.  
Angle of friction for the fill material was set equal to 290,as 
determined from the post-failure tests.  Fig. 6 shows the range 
of the width of the failure wedge observed in the filed.  Fig. 6 
also shows the failure surface with 2m top width, which was 
used in the stability analysis.  The wedge was divided into 8 
slices for the analysis. 
 
 
Fig.6. Section of RSR Wall showing Critical Surface Analysed 
 
Remedial Measures to Stabilise the RSR Wall 
 
Remedial measures to stabilize the RSR wall are presented 
briefly.  As the highway carries high volumes of traffic, the 
road can not be closed even for a few days.  Immediately after 
failure, gabion wall, with stone backfilling and woven steel 
mesh baskets was installed along the failed face for a length of 
20m.  Fig. 7 shows the failed section of the RSR wall along 
with the gabion wall built to restore stability. The stepped 
gabion wall has a base width of 8 m, with gabions of 1 m 
height. The need for the urgent restoration of the highway to 
uninterrupted traffic movement dictated the choice of gabion 
wall as a stabilizing measure. Although gabion wall looks 
unwieldy, it was installed very fast, in less than 7 days, largely 
with manual labour. 
 
Fig. 8 shows the cross section of distressed stretch, where 6 m 
long nails were installed. The installation was done by drilling 
a borehole of 50 mm diameter through the facia panel and fill, 
and subsequently grouting the hole. The diameter of steel nails 
is 20 mm. The average density of steel nails was on nail per 
sq. m of face area. This remedial measure was carried out over 
a 40 m of length of RSR wall which had experienced outward 
movements of up to 450 mm. The RSR wall continues to be 
under observation. Design of steel nails and related aspects are  
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Fig.8. Cross Section of RSR Wall with Steel Nails 
 
beyond the scope of the paper.  This was completed within a 
few days and traffic could move unhindered.  In other sections 
having severe distress and needing strengthening of the RSR 
wall, 6m long steel nails are installed, at a density of one nail 
per sq.m of face area. 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNT FROM ANALYSIS OF FAILURE 
 
Various deficiencies in the design that resulted in the failure of 
the RSR wall have been discussed in detail in the preceding 
sections. The lessons learnt from the analysis are summarized 
in the following paras: 
 
a) The reduction factors used in arriving at the design 
strength values of the geogrids were low and lower 
than the manufacturer’s recommended values.  
Further, the creep properties of HDPE geogrids are 
highly temperature sensitive and this factor was not 
taken into consideration in the design.   
  
 As a result, the design stress values were higher than 
 desirable. 
b) The fill soil had fines passing 75 microns in the range 
of 25-30%. Still, the friction angle of 35 was 
considered possible at the field levels compaction of 
95% standard Proctor compaction density.  However, 
careful tests in independent laboratory showed the 
friction value of the fill to be 29.This discrepancy 
implies that the actual stress values in the geogrids 
are higher than the values shown in the design.  Also, 
safety factors in pull out would be far less than 
estimated, importantly, for the critical top layer. 
c) The design adopted does not adequately conform to 
the provisions of any design manual or code, but 
chooses bits and pieces from such documents in an 
arbitrary manner. 
d) It appears that the large deformations observed ought 
have been heeded as early warning signs.  The 
optimistic interpretation that wall movements would 
stabilize following completion of construction did not 
materialize.  Each of the factors discussed in the 
previous sections had the effect of lowering the 
safety margin available. 
e) It may be concluded that the failure was initiated as 
outward deformations were accumulating with time 
due to the high initial level of stress in the geogrids.  
The errors in the spacing geogrids which resulted in 
the top panels being left unsupported had also 
aggravated the deformations.  Creep process, 
accentuated by the high ambient temperatures, had 
accelerated the progress of deformations.  The error 
in the spacing of geogrids leaving the top panels 
unsupported triggered the deformation process, as 
well as rendered their control difficult. 
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 It may hence be concluded that the failure is a 
cumulative effect of the various deficiencies and is 
progressive in nature.   
 
f) It is not the usual practice to quantitatively estimate 
wall deformations nor is there any widely accepted 
method for the same.  At the point of time the project 
was taken up it is indeed very rare to consider 
deformations as apart of the design. 
 
It appears necessary that future design methods and 
codes establish reliable methods for working out 
deformations and also their progression with time. 
 
The present case study amply bears out the need for 
the same. 
 
g) When a structure under construction shows signs 
distressed behaviour, it would be advantageous that 
the structure is monitored irrespective of whether 
such provision is available in the contract.  Such a 
step would help any changes to be made in the design 
or construction at right time, ensure the stability of 
the structure as well as avoid costly remedial 
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